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Introduction
Honorable James D. Heiple,*
Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois
I am honored to introduce this Judicial Conference Symposium
Issue of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. I am confident
that the articles contained in this issue will, as in years past, provide
judges, practitioners, and scholars with a valuable source of
information about Illinois law.
The timely and insightful contributions to this issue written by my
colleagues on the Illinois bench have reminded me of the important
role the judiciary plays in our system of government, and of the
necessity of preserving that role. I therefore desire to direct these
introductory remarks to the topic of judicial independence.
As every American schoolchild learns, governments in this country
are composed of three separate branches. In spite of this, one rarely
hears talk of "legislative independence" or "executive independence."
Yet the need for judicial independence is a common subject of legal,
* Justice Heiple graduated with a Bachelor of Science Degree from Bradley
University in June, 1955, with a Juris Doctor Degree from the University of Louisville
College of Law in June, 1957, and received the Master of Laws Degree from the
University of Virginia in 1988. Justice Heiple has written and had published a variety of
articles in professional and other journals, including the National Bar Examiner. His
thesis on the history of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar appeared in the
Southern Illinois University Law Journal.
After graduating from law school, Justice Heiple joined his father and brother in the
family law firm of Heiple and Heiple, where he engaged in the general practice of law
with offices in Washington, D.C., and Pekin, Illinois. While in general law practice, he
also served as an Appellate Law Clerk, as a Public Defender, and as a Special Master in
Chancery.
Justice Heiple was elected to the Illinois Circuit Court in 1970. In 1980, he was
elected Justice of the Illinois Appellate Court. In 1985, and again in 1990, he served as
Presiding Justice of the Third District Appellate Court. In 1990, he was elected Justice
of the Illinois Supreme Court where he presently serves.
Throughout his professional career Justice Heiple has remained an active member of
the community. He has been a member of numerous civic groups and local
organizations, including positions as Director of the Pekin Kiwanis Club, President of
the Administrative Board of Grace United Methodist Church of Pekin, and Executive
Board member as well as a neighborhood counselor for the Boy Scouts of America. He
has been sought after as a public speaker and has given the laymen's sermon in a number
of Illinois churches. He has appeared before a wide variety of professional, church, and
civic groups.
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political, and academic discourse, giving rise to the following
question: What is it about the nature of the judiciary which so
demands independence?
A useful starting point in answering this question is President John
Adams's declaration that the United States is "a government of laws,
and not of men."' Among this country's founders were many who
had experienced firsthand the oppression of arbitrary rulers. These
earliest Americans desired to create a regime which would be at once
strong enough to govern effectively and yet restrained in its powers.
Simply put, they sought to implement the rule of law-and to do so
more fully and completely than ever before in human history.
Drawing upon a rich Enlightenment tradition of political theory, the
founders constructed a unique system which divided governmental
powers between different branches. At the heart of this arrangement is
the legislature, constituted to ensure that the will of the people dictates
the laws by which society is governed. Similarly, the executive is also
made dependent on popular will, in order to guarantee the people a
continual voice in the administration of the laws. With respect to the
interpretation of the laws, however, and their application to specific
cases, the founders had quite different concerns.
In The Federalist, Publius contended that the greatest disadvantage
of republican governments is their susceptibility to domination by an
overbearing majority, or faction.2 Precisely because the legislative and
executive branches are controlled by the popular will of transitory
majorities, there is a constant risk that those branches will employ
governmental power to oppress people in the minority, or to impair the
interests of society as a whole. The founders believed that arbitrary,
tyrannical rule could arise from democracies as well as despots.
To alleviate this danger, the founders intentionally insulated the
judicial function from popular control. Once selected, judges are to
hold office nearly indefinitely. In addition, their salaries may not be
reduced while in office.3 Although such provisions alarmed some
critics who were familiar with the abuses of monarchy, the founders
assured them that the judiciary presents no threat of tyranny because it
is the "least dangerous" branch of government.4 While the legislature
I. Novanglus Papers, No. 7, BOSTON GAZETTE, 1774 (quoted in FAMOUS QUOTATIONS
521 (John Bartlett ed., 16th ed. 1992)).
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
3. In Illinois, our constitution also includes provisions which prevent laws
abolishing a judgeship or altering a judicial district's boundaries from taking effect
during the tenure of a sitting judge. ILL. CONST. arts. XI, XII.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
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controls the power of the purse and the executive wields the sword,
the judicial branch governs only by the force of the ideas contained in
its judgments.
The advantages of judicial independence are numerous, but I wish
to focus here on two which I believe are central to its genius: first, the
preservation of limited government; and second, the protection of
individual rights.
The American experiment in democracy has succeeded largely
because we have adhered to the founder's original goal to be governed
by written laws. The most fundamental of these laws are the
constitutions which divide and assign powers among the various
branches of government. For our democracy to continue to function
properly, these divisions must be respected. As demonstrated in the
writings of the founders, the judiciary is the appropriate body to
enforce this separation of powers. Alexander Hamilton observed that
limitations upon the powers of government can be preserved only
through the courts, because the more popularly-controlled branches
continually attempt to enlarge their own spheres of influence. In a
similar vein, Thomas Jefferson argued that
[t]he dignity and stability of government in all its branches ...
depend so much upon an upright and skillful administration of
justice, that the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the
legislative and executive, and independent [of] both, so that it
may be a check upon both ...6
In addition to maintaining the constitutional structure of
government, the judiciary is also the only branch which can be trusted
to fairly interpret and enforce legislative enactments. The insulation of
judges from popular passions allows them to persist in impartial
application of the laws even when this compels a result disagreeable to
public opinion. Learned Hand noted that "it is of critical consequence
that [the laws] should be loyally enforced until they are amended by
the same process which made them."7 Since the judiciary exercises
neither force nor will, but instead only judgment, 8 it is best able to
preserve the proper roles of government.
1961).
5. Id. at 466, 469-70.
6. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to George Wythe (June 1776), in I PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 410 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
7. Learned Hand (quoted in A TREASURY OF LEGAL QUOTATIONS 79 (Paul C. Cook ed.
1961)).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465.
1997] 663
6 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Second, judicial independence is the cornerstone of individual
liberty. Hamilton wrote that "the independence of the judges" is
essential to "guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from
the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men...
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which...
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community. ' 9 Protecting the
rights of minorities is never a popular task, and only a truly
independent judiciary can accomplish it regularly. But without this
first line Of defense, the liberty of all members of society is
endangered. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story warned
nearly two centuries ago:
Laws, however wholesome or necessary, are frequently the
objects of temporary aversion and popular odium, and
sometimes of popular resistance. Nothing is more facile in
republics than for demagogues, under artful pretences, to stir up
combinations against the regular exercise of authority. Their
selfish purposes are too often interrupted by the firmness and
independence of upright magistrates, not to make them at all
times hostile to a power which rebukes and an impartiality which
condemns them. The judiciary, as the weakest point in the
Constitution on which to make an attack, is therefore constantly
that to which they direct their assaults; and a triumph here, aided
by any momentary popular encouragement, achieves a lasting
victory over the Constitution itself. Hence, in republics, those
who are to profit by public commotions or the prevalence of
factions, are always the enemies of a regular and independent
administration of justice. They spread all sorts of delusion, in
order to mislead the public mind and excite the public
prejudices. They know full well that without the aid of the
people, their schemes must prove abortive; and they therefore
employ every art to undermine the public confidence, and to
make the people the instruments of subverting their own rights
and liberties.'
Thankfully, Justice Story's scenario has been the exception rather
than the rule throughout most of American history. Nevertheless, his
words continue to resonate, especially in light of the heightened
influence of the modem-day media, and stand as a warning to citizens
to be ever mindful of safeguarding judicial independence in order to
preserve their freedoms.
9. Id. at 469.
10. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 424
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1891).
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In conclusion, may I express my admiration and appreciation for
each of my colleagues on the bench who endeavors to fulfill his or her
unique constitutional role faithfully, without public fanfare or acclaim.
The work of a conscientious judge is seldom easy and often lonely; but
due to its crucial necessity in our system of government, it can also be
deeply rewarding. Again, Justice Story:
[Judges] may sometimes find the other departments [of
government] combined in hostility against the judicial; and even
the people for a while, under the influence of party spirit and
turbulent factions, ready to abandon them to their fate. Few
men possess the firmness to resist the torrent of popular
opinion; or are content to sacrifice present ease and public favor
in order to earn the slow rewards of a conscientious discharge of
duty; the sure but distant gratitude of the people; and the severe
but enlightened award of posterity.'
I 1. Id. at 430.
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